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McGill Law Journal -

Revue de droit de McGill

THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Evan Fox-DecentandEvanj Criddle*
I.

Introduction

We would like to express our sincere thanks to the McGill Law Journal for organizing the symposium that was the wellspring for this volume.
We gratefully acknowledge as well our debt to the volume's contributorsSeth Davis, Chim~ne Keitner, Fr6d6ric M6gret, Jens David Ohlin, Edmund Robinson, and Kimberley N. Trapp-and to colleagues who participated in the symposium by offering valuable commentary: Margaret
de Guzman, Colin Grey, Richard Janda, and Patrick Macklem.
We will offer reflections on our colleagues' insightful commentary in
Part IV. Before doing so, however, we will first use this opportunity to offer a brief restatement of two central ideas from Fiduciariesof Humanity,1
and their relationship to one another: the prohibition on unilateralism
and the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy. The prohibition on unilateralism
is a legal principle that denies one party any authority or entitlement to
dictate terms to another party of equal standing. The fiduciary criterion of
legitimacy is a standard of adequacy for assessing the normative legitimacy and lawfulness of the actions of international public actors. The criterion demands that public actions have a representational character in that,
for them to be legitimate and lawful, they must be intelligible as actions
taken in the name of, or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. In
Part II, we elaborate on some of the ways international law reflects the
prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion. We suggest that
the two are complementary, and that their synthesis comprises an internal morality of international law.
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In Part III, we elaborate on our conception of the internal morality of
international law, drawing on the writings of Lon L. Fuller. We compare
the fiduciary internal morality with the Fullerian theory developed by
Jutta Brun6e and Stephen Toope, and suggest that the fiduciary theory
can underwrite a compelling account of the rule of international law. We
then use the fiduciary construal of the rule of international law, in
Part IV, to develop or comment on our colleagues' contributions to this
volume.

II. Standing to Resist Unilateralism
In Fiduciariesof Humanity, we suggest that the prohibition on unilateralism operates as an organizing idea of international law at a number of
levels and across a wide range of fields. At the interstate level, the principle explains the foundational doctrine of sovereign equality according to
which states enjoy legal equality and independence from one another,
since independent equals cannot dictate terms to one another. States are
thus barred at international law from violating the territorial integrity of
other states, and from otherwise interfering unilaterally in the internal
affairs of other states. When disputes arise, states are expected to pursue
good faith negotiations, with resort to impartial third-party arbitration or
adjudication if necessary.1
At the intrastate level, the prohibition on unilateralism bars individuals from dictating terms to one another. If one individual were legally entitled to impose terms of interaction on another, the principle of legal
equality would be compromised. The ascendant party to the interaction
would possess a legal prerogative not enjoyed by the other. On a Kantian
construal, the prohibition on unilateralism follows from Kant's innate
right to equal freedom; the mere subjection of one individual to the will of

another (even if the other is reasonable, acting in good faith, and so on) is
a wrongful compromise of equal freedom. On a Hobbesian construal, unilateralism's violation of the principle of legal equality is enough to demonstrate its wrongfulness. At the intrastate level of individuals and groups
interacting with one another as private parties, the prohibition on unilateralism bears on horizontal relations between those individuals and
groups.

We argue in Fiduciariesof Humanity that the prohibition on unilateralism may be understood to have two aspects. One is captured by the
Kantian principle that no person may be treated as a mere means, but only as an end, which is the principle of non-instrumentalization. The other
1

See ibid at ch 8; Evan J Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism"
(2019) 113:2 Am J Intl L 272 [Criddle &Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism"].
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aspect is the republican principle of non-domination, according to which
one person may not be subject to the arbitrary will of another. The Kantian principle condemns actual abuse. The republican principle condemns
the possession of arbitrary power that would make abuse possible, whether or not the power is ever in fact used abusively. On our construal, international law recognizes and authorizes states to govern and represent
their people to safeguard them against instrumentalization and domination, and thereby provide for their equal freedom and legal equality.
States offer a vertical relation of authority to resolve a horizontal problem
of injustice.
But states, of course, bring serious risks of new forms of instrumentalization and domination. International law, we argue, mitigates those risks
by subjecting states to a variety of legal regimes protective of equal freedom and legal equality, such as international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international law's regime for regulating
emergencies. Within these regimes, some norms, such as the prohibitions
on genocide and torture, are regarded as peremptory or jus cogens, and
are of a kind from which no limitation or derogation is permitted. Two
puzzles are immediately apparent. First, on what principled basis can we
distinguish peremptory from non-peremptory norms? Second, how can we
distinguish legitimate and lawful state action from wrongful counterfeits
that constitute abuse or domination? The fiduciary criterion of legitimacy
emerges from the fiduciary theory's answers to these questions.
In our view, peremptory norms prohibit policies of intractable abuse or
domination that could never be understood to be adopted in the name of,
or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. Genocide and torture, for example, are not intelligible as policies that could be adopted in the name of,
or on behalf of, their victims. By contrast, policies that modestly limit
freedom of expression for publicly avowable reasons (e.g., health warnings
on cigarette packages) are intelligible as polices that could be adopted in
the name of, or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. Put another
way, publicly justifiable limitations on certain human rights (e.g., the
right to freedom of expression) are consistent with fiduciary norms of
stewardship and representation that govern public authorities. We have
argued that these include principles of integrity (resisting corruption and
capture), formal moral equality (like cases receive like treatment), and solicitude (due regard for legitimate interests). The process and substance of
democratic public justification embodies the principles of integrity and
formal moral equality, and demonstrates due regard for the legitimate interests of the people on whose behalf and in whose name authorities govern. In the case of peremptory norms, no such justification is possible because any infringement of these norms constitutes wrongful instrumentalization or domination, and so cannot be action taken in the name of, or
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on behalf of, the persons made to suffer it. The fiduciary criterion of legitimacy thus emerges as a standard of adequacy that takes its cues from
the norms that constitute and regulate representation, which are also
norms that resist instrumentalization and domination. In this context,
the fiduciary criterion lets us distinguish peremptory from nonperemptory norms.
In Fiduciariesof Humanity, however, we argue that the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy has a wider mission than picking outjus cogens norms
from the diverse catalogue of international legal rights and obligations.
And, we suggest that the criterion results ultimately from the fiduciary
structure of international legal order. Roughly, our account is that there
is a fiduciary power-conferring rule (the "fiduciary principle") within international legal order akin to the power-conferring rule pacta sunt
servanda that transforms international agreements into binding treaties.
The fiduciary principle authorizes states to possess and use public powers,
but on condition that those powers be used in the name of, or on behalf of,
every person subject to them. The nature of public power on our theory is
therefore fundamentally representational, and its scope is comprehensive
across persons amenable to the relevant authority's jurisdiction. The fiduciary criterion of legitimacy, therefore, is generated by the fiduciary principle's limited and conditional authorization of public powers as well as
anti-unilateralist norms of role that constitute and govern representation.
The fiduciary criterion provides a normative standard for assessing
the moral legitimacy of a given policy. In the case of extraterritorially detained terror suspects, for example, we argue that it would be morally
reprehensible to deny them humane treatment and due process. Such a
denial would instrumentalize the suspect and undermine the state's claim
to have authority to detain, since the detaining state would hold the suspect in a manner that could not credibly be said to be done in the name or,
or on behalf of, the detainee. For the detaining state to make such a claim,
the state has to be conceived as a fiduciary of humanity, and as acting on
behalf of humanity in a manner consistent with minimal legal protections.
We suggest that the structure and operation of international refugee
law reveal vividly the idea of states as local fiduciaries of their people and
also global fiduciaries of humanity. In this context, we also claim that the
fiduciary criterion can play a conceptual as well as normative role. On our
account, the fiduciary principle authorizes states to possess joint stewardship of the earth's surface, but requires as a condition of its authorization
that states participate as fiduciaries of humanity in a collective regime of
surrogate protection in the service of exiled outsiders. Otherwise, an exiled outsider could find herself with nowhere to go. Her very existence
would constitute a trespass wherever she happened to be. We thus advocate treating the duty of non-refoulement as a customary and peremptory
norm of international law from which states are not entitled to resile.
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Were states to have such an entitlement, the legitimacy of international
law's distribution of territory to sates would be undermined because that
distribution could not be said to be made in the name or, or on behalf of,
humanity; exiled outsiders would be excluded. From the perspective of international law, states that enforce exclusionary practices against necessitous asylum seekers do so unlawfully. The failure to satisfy the fiduciary
criterion would also be a failure to meet an intrinsic requirement of international law.
In sum, the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy articulates a representational ideal that serves as a normative and conceptual standard of adequacy. While it is always concerned with fidelity to role-based norms arising from representation, the criterion also invites critical assessment of
complex interactions of law and social facts, as seen in the case of international refugee law. And the criterion presupposes that if it is satisfied,
then the relevant authority will have standing to govern and represent
the people amenable to its jurisdiction. Whereas unilateralism is the problem for which public authority claims to be the remedy, the fiduciary criterion sets the standard public authority must meet both to succeed in its
anti-unilateralist mission and to have standing to rule. Combining the
prohibition on unilateralism with the fiduciary criterion, we argue now,
discloses the internal morality of international law.
III. The Internal Morality of International Law
In Fiduciariesof Humanity, we explain in greater detail how the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion are immanent in the
juridical structure of positive international law, including the regimes
that govern international human rights, armed conflict, detention of foreign nationals, and forced migration. We argue that these principles are
constitutive of state sovereignty under international law, such that violations of these principles undermine a state's claim to exercise legitimate
authority. In the discussion that follows, we make the case that the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy are essential features of international law's internal morality.
Our suggestion that international law has an "internal morality"
builds on Fuller's account of the rule of law. Fuller envisioned law as a
form of social ordering that uses authoritative directives to "create the
conditions essential for a rational human existence."2 In developing his
theory of the rule of law, Fuller emphasized the need for lawmakers to re-

2

Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1969) at 9.

770

(2018) 63:3&4 MCGILL LAWJOURNAL-REVUE

DE DROITDE MCGILL

spect human autonomy and rationality. Respecting human autonomy and
rationality was not merely a normative ideal, Fuller contended, but also a
practical necessity for those who aspired to establish a legal system. For
law to thrive as a form of social ordering, public authorities must appeal
to the rational capacities of persons by enabling those persons to understand what the law requires and how the law will be applied so they can
conform their actions to its demands. Only when government treats the
law's subjects as rational, self-determining agents will its commands be
capable of attracting compliance and thereby nurturing a culture of legality.
Perhaps the most influential feature of Fuller's social theory of law is
his insight that government directives must share certain formal properties to generate legal order. In particular: (1) the directives must express
general, not ad hoc, commands; (2) they must be publicized; (3) they must
not be applied retroactively; (4) they must be intelligible; (5) they must
not be contradictory; (6) they must not "require conduct beyond the pow-

ers of the affected party"; (7) they must be relatively stable to enable compliance; and (8) there must be "congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration." A directive that failed to satisfy any of these eight desiderata would be "futile" from the standpoint of
contributing to a genuine "legal system," because it would afford no rational basis for people to orient their behavior in response to it.4 The eight
desiderata are also morally consequential, Fuller asserted, because a person's moral duty to obey directives from public authorities would depend
upon the directives taking a form that could rationally attract compliance.
As Fuller explains,
there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or
was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same
5
system, or commanded the impossible, or changed every minute.
Fuller observed that these features of a functional legal system establish "a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with respect to the observance of rules."6 Should public authorities fail to govern
with directives that satisfy the eight desiderata, their relationship with
their people would lack the reciprocity necessary to generate legal authority. When this "bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by

3 Ibid at 39.
4 See ibid.
5
6

Ibid.
Ibid.
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government," Fuller explains, "nothing is left on which to ground the citi7
zen's duty to observe rules."
Although Fuller characterized his eight formal criteria as representing
law's "internal morality," he never claimed that a failure to satisfy these
criteria was the only way that an "attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry."8 In Fiduciariesof Humanity we argue
that certain substantive criteria are also constitutive of international authority. The concerns that motivated Fuller's theory-namely, respect for
human autonomy and rationality-support our fiduciary theory of sovereignty. To merit recognition as law, directives from public authorities
must offer rational grounds for compliance. Directives that violate the
prohibition against unilateralism or the fiduciary criterion cannot furnish
these kinds of reasons.9 For example, there is no rational basis to conclude
that people have moral obligations to comply with public directives that
authorize their own enslavement, arbitrary detention, or torture. These
kinds of directives are not plausibly interpretable as actions taken on behalf of the persons subject to them. Accordingly, slavery, arbitrary detention, torture and other violations of international jus cogens dismantle the
reciprocity that is necessary, both practically and morally, to sustain legal
order. Thus, the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion
constitute substantive desiderata of international law's internal morality.
This insight offers valuable lessons for international legal theory.
Among scholars of international law, Professors Jutta Brunn6e and Stephen Toope have proven to be Fuller's most eloquent and devoted disciples, 10 but their exclusive focus on Fuller's eight desiderata commits them
to a distorted vision of international legal order. In their "interactional account" of international law, Brunn6e and Toope contend that international law's authority arises from "three interlocking elements" inspired by
Fuller:
First, legal norms are social norms and as such they are connected to
social practice - they must be grounded in shared understandings.
Second, what distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is
not so much form or pedigree, as adherence to [Fuller's] specific cri-

7

Ibid at 39 40.

8

Ibid at 38-39.

9 We do not argue here or in Fiduciariesof Humanity that satisfying these principles is a
sufficient condition to generate legal obligations.

10 The two scholars have developed this account most fully in their excellent monograph:
see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J Toope Legitimacy and Legality in InternationalLaw:
An InteractionalAccount (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [Brunn6e &

Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in InternationalLaw].
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teria of legality. When norm creation meets these criteria and, third,
is matched with norm application that also satisfies the legality requirements, international law will have legitimacy and generate a
sense of commitment among those to whom it is addressed.11
Brunn6e and Toope argue that Fuller's desiderata are sufficient to explain
why some international norms qualify as legally authoritative, while others do not. Their account plausibly explains some features of international
law, including the scope of states' legal obligations in the global regime to
confront climate change.12 Yet, when their focus shifts to international
human rights, their theory proves wholly inadequate to explain the peremptory authority of jus cogens norms. To their own evident discomfort, 13
Brunn6e and Toope feel compelled by their own theory to conclude that
the prohibition against torture is not legally binding because state practice is not sufficiently congruent with the positive norm. 14 This despite the
fact that the prohibition against torture continues to be universally accepted-even by the very states that have practised torture-as a peremptory norm of international law. 15
Brunn6e and Toope's interactional account of the prohibition against
torture suffers from two flaws. The first is their mistaken assumption
that adherence to Fuller's eight desiderata is sufficient to give people rational grounds "to have their behavior guided by the promulgated rules
even if they disagree with them on substantive grounds." 16 As we have
shown in Fiduciariesof Humanity and elaborate more fully here, when
national laws or practices intractably violate either the prohibition on unilateralism (i.e., the principles of non-instrumentalization and nondomination) or the fiduciary criterion, merely satisfying Fuller's eight desiderata cannot supply rational grounds for compliance. Second, when
evaluating whether a human rights norm is legally binding, the relevant
inquiry is not (as Brunn6e and Toope suppose) whether violations of the
norm dissolve states' moral obligations to comply. Human rights norms do
not exist for the benefit of states but for the benefit of human beings subject to their power. Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether the pur-

l Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J Toope, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force:
Building Legality?" (2010) 2:3 Global Responsibility to Protect 191 at 193.
12 Brunn6e & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in InternationalLaw, supra note 11 at 268.
13 See ibid ('Quite frankly, we are not at all comfortable with the conclusion to which our
analysis draws us in relation to the prohibition on torture, but we are firmly convinced
that the analysis is nonetheless correct.").
14 See ibid at 269.
15

16

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmt d i,
§ 102 cmt k (1987).
Brunn6e & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in InternationalLaw, supra note 11 at 30.
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ported incongruence between the positive norm against torture and state
practice gives people who are subject to state power a rational reason to
submit to torture at the direction of their own state. To ask this question
is, of course, to answer it. States cannot rationally suppose that their people have a moral obligation to submit to their authority when the outcome
is torture. Accordingly, when states authorize torture or other violations
of peremptory norms of international law, these directives are incapable
of generating legal powers and duties. They are simply void ab initio, as
17
reflected in the doctrine ofjus cogens.
IV. Cultivating the Rule of (International) Law
Having explained how the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion can complement a Fullerian internal morality of international law, we are now better equipped to understand what it would mean
to cultivate the rule of international law. Cultivating the rule of law at the
global level means establishing rightful relationships between states and
other transnational authorities, on the one hand, and the people who are
subject to them, on the other. As Fuller recognized, these relationships
can be understood as governed by the rule of law only if public authorities
treat people as rational, self-determining agents by establishing rules that
satisfy certain formal criteria. Taken to its logical conclusion, Fuller's account of the rule of law also demands that public authorities respect the
prohibition against unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion. In short,
states and other transnational authorities cultivate the rule of international law when they treat people subject to their jurisdiction as equal
beneficiaries of international legal order.18 While we cannot work out a
fully realized account of the rule of international law in this brief reply es-

say, we use the space that remains to reflect on this theme while engaging
with our colleagues' contributions in this volume.
In Fiduciariesof Humanity, we make the case that international law
already embraces the rule of law's substantive dimension to an extent
that has yet to be fully recognized by the international legal community.
International law now defines sovereignty in relational terms, with the fiduciary criterion playing a central role in the constitution and distribution

17

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 53
(entered into force 27 January 1980) ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.").

18

We offer some guidance on what this would mean for inter-state relations in Criddle &
Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism", supra note 2.
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of state authority.19 The fiduciary criterion also supplies a standard for
assessing the exercise of sovereign power, as reflected in peremptory
norms of international law that govern human rights, armed conflict, mi-

gration, the environment, and other fields of international concern.
Some readers of our work have confused our theory of the rule of international law with an aspiration to colonize public law with private law
rules and remedies. There is indeed a long history of international lawyers injecting private law doctrines into international legal discourse via
doctrinal transplantation and analogical reasoning 2 0 This is not our approach, however. We do not advocate applying private law directly to international relations, nor do we argue that states are merely analogous to
private law fiduciaries, such that private law rules and remedies would
translate smoothly to public international law. Rather, we argue that the
fiduciary theory of state sovereignty offers a conceptual and normative
framework that captures the relational character of public authority under international law. Characterizing states as fiduciaries makes sense,
we argue, because fiduciary relationships governed by private law and international law, respectively, share a common juridical structure: in both
contexts, fiduciary relationships arise when one party holds entrusted
power over another party's legal or practical interests. International law
therefore recognizes the relationship between a state and its people as a
bona fide fiduciary relationship, albeit one that is sui generis and governed by legal requirements (e.g., human rights, jus cogens) that are responsive to the distinctive threats of domination and instrumentalization
that arise within this relationship.
Our methodology in Fiduciaries of Humanity is not simply to posit
non-domination and non-instrumentalization as first principles and then
to reason by deduction toward specific rules that accord with our ideal
conception of the rule of law. Instead, we employ a blend of inference to
the best explanation and Rawls's idea of a "reflective equilibrium"21-an
interpretivist methodology which requires that we take seriously the distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda 2 2 Using this methodology, we sift

19 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciariesof Humanity, supra note 1 at ch 1 2. See also
Anne Peters, "Humanity as the A and 2 of Sovereignty" (2009) 20:3 Eur J Intl L 513;
Helen Stacy, "Relational Sovereignty' (2003) 55:5 Stan L Rev 2029.
20 See H Lauterpacht, PrivateLaw Sources andAnalogies of InternationalLaw (with Special Reference to InternationalArbitration)(London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1927).
21 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)
at 20.
22 Accordingly, Trapp & Robinson are mistaken to insinuate that we treat the fiduciary
principle as a "source" of international legal obligations. See Kimberley N Trapp & Ed-
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through centuries of international legal theory and practice to show how

the fiduciary conception of state sovereignty has become firmly entrenched in international legal order. We do not argue that the fiduciary
theory can explain every feature of international law. But we do claim
that the theory best explains and justifies certain constitutional elements
of international law, such as peremptory norms and the emerging rules of
state recognition, which are incompatible with the classical conception of
sovereignty as an "absolute" and "supreme" power that is "subject to no
law." 23

Fiduciariesof Humanity occasionally offers arguments for clarifying
or revising established rules of international law. For example, we propose that when a state responds with force to attacks from nonstate actors
abroad, international human rights law's (IHRL) restrictive standards for
the use of force should apply. We base this proposal on the observation
that when a state uses force against nonstate actors abroad, it arguably
exercises public powers in the host state's place, operating as a temporary
agent of necessity under international law24 If this is so, it follows that an
intervening state would assume the host state's fiduciary obligation to respect the "right to life,' as enshrined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other instruments.2 5 Although we recognize
that IHRL's applicability to asymmetric self-defense is not yet firmly established in positive law, we do identify some tentative shifts toward this
approach in state practice, and we speculate that these developments
might eventually crystallize into firm customary or treaty-based obligations.
Trapp and Robinson reject this application of our theory. They argue
that "[c]haracterizing the intervening state, in the context of asymmetrical self-defense, as a surrogate sovereign is unrealistic" and "unlikely to
be effective in practice."26 In addition, they object that our theory does not
adequately "acknowledge or engage with" the tension between a state's

mund Robinson, "Extra-Territorial 'Fiduciary' Obligations and 'Ensuring' Respect for
International Humanitarian Law"' (2018) 63:3&4 McGill LJ 675 at 684.
23 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la R&publique, ed by Christian Fr6mont, Marie-Dominique
Couzinet &Henri Rochais (Paris: Fayard, 1986) at 179 228, 295 310.
24 See Criddle &Fox-Decent, Fiduciariesof Humanity, supra note 1 at 190.
25 See InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171 art 6(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976).
26 Trapp & Robinson, supra note 23 at 683
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own "security interests" and the "human rights" concerns of foreign nationals.27
We nonetheless remain convinced that our proposal to apply human
rights standards to asymmetric self-defense is not a utopian fantasy. As
we show, the United States has already incorporated human rights-style
standards into its rules of engagement for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and it has employed these rules in a variety of
conflicts. IHRL's restrictive rules for the use of force are not always operationally convenient, but experience attests that they are feasible and can
be employed effectively in conventional settings involving asymmetric
self-defense. Nor have we overlooked the obvious tensions between a
state's duties to its own people and its duties to foreign nationals abroad.
Indeed, our chapter on the law of armed conflict focuses on working out a
principled resolution to this problem.28 We explain that this problem is
hardly unique to the law of armed conflict; across a variety of international regimes-including those that govern national security detention and
refugee protection-international law requires states to balance competing fiduciary obligations toward their own people, on the one hand, and to
foreign nationals, on the other29
Ultimately, Trapp and Robinson's argument boils down to the assertion that IHL norms, not IHRL norms, are "inherently" superior when it
comes to "balanc[ing] the interests of the intervening state's domestic
population ...
against the rights to physical integrity of the local population to the armed conflict." 30 For the reasons we have articulated, we do
not consider IHL's superiority to be so self-evident. In our view, the nonbelligerent relationship between an intervening state and a host state
during asymmetric armed conflict points toward IHRL's more demanding
standards for the use of force. Taking the international rule of law seriously (including the prohibition against unilateralism and the fiduciary
criterion) would require that intervening states be prepared to publicly
justify their use of force as the least harmful means available, as well as
show that any collateral harm to innocent civilians is no greater than
strictly necessary to neutralize the threat.
Keitner's essay for this symposium explains how this kind of public
justification is standard practice in the international legal system.31 Motivated in part by our recent debate with Ethan Leib and Stephen Galoob
27

See ibid.

28 See Criddle &Fox-Decent, Fiduciariesof Humanity, supra note 1 at ch 5.
29 See ibid at ch 6-7.

30 Trapp & Robinson, supra note 23 at 683.
31 See Chinmne L Keitner, "Explaining International Acts" (2018) 63:3&4 McGill LJ 649.
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over the role of justification in IHRL,32 Keitner shows that a robust "culture of justification ...
exists at the international level" and "includes an
expectation that states will articulate the legal and policy bases for their
actions, particularly when such actions depart from accepted norms of
state behavior."33 She traces this culture of justification through four episodes involving the use of force that have seized the world's attention
within the past two decades: the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo
(1999); international military action in Iraq (2003); Russia's intervention
in Crimea (2014); and American, British, and French missile strikes in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons (2017). In each of these episodes, states felt compelled by international law's culture of justification
to explain and defend their actions to the broader international community.
Keitner's account of international law's culture of justification resonates with the internal morality of international law as we have described
it in this essay. When states seek to persuade one another concerning the
lawfulness of their cross-border military actions and other deviations from
international law's default rules, they respect the internal morality of international law. As Keitner observes, the practice of public justification
contributes to clarifying and crystallizing the content of customary inter4
national law, while also promoting compliance with established rules.3

"From the perspective of fiduciary theory," Keitner explains, "the core insight is that an account of compliance that focuses exclusively on outcomes misses an important part of what makes international law law:
namely, the ex ante and ex post processes of justification and explanation
that shape actors' collective understandings of what constitutes internationally permissible conduct."35 Thus, international law's culture of justification contributes to a Fullerian legal order by promoting publicity, clarity, consistency, stability, and congruence.
Ohlin's essay stacks one provocative claim upon another. The first is
that the doctrine of jus cogens is only seriously defensible from a natural
law perspective. The second is that it was only the murkiness of various
Compare Ethan J Leib & Stephen R Galoob, "Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique"
(2016) 125:7 Yale LJ 1820 at 1877 (arguing that a "rigorous culture of justification [does
not] appl[y] to the international realm) with Evan J Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, "Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory: A Reply to Leib and Galoob" (2016) 126
Yale LJ Forum 192 at 195 (defending the view that IHRL requires justifications, not
merely outcomes).
33 Keitner, supra note 32, at 651 (citing the work of Etienne Mureinik and David Dyzenhaus on the concept of a "culture of justification").
34 See ibid at 652 57.
35 Ibid at 673.
32
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accounts of jus cogens that likely prevented the doctrine from being discredited or falling into disuse, given the dominance of legal positivism after the Second World War. He suggests we are not as forthright as we
might be about what he perceives as the fiduciary theory's natural law (or
36
natural law-ish) account of jus cogens.
Throughout Fiduciariesof Humanity we prescind from entering jurisprudential debates about the ultimate nature of international law. Our
chief aim is to offer an interpretive account of some of international law's
central doctrines and principles. While we are sympathetic to Ohlin's position, our hope is that the book might be attractive to inclusive legal positivists as well as natural lawyers. In principle, inclusive positivists could
interpret the fiduciary criterion as a standard of adequacy that goes exclusively to the normative merits (and not validity) of international
norms. By contrast, anti-positivists can interpret the criterion as offering
a limited, substantive standard that in some cases (e.g., jus cogens) calls
into question the legal validity of inconsistent measures.37
In his essay, Davis takes issue with the fiduciary theory's purported
ratification of state sovereignty," arguing that the state system displaces
and effaces alternative forms of political association, such as those traditionally used by Indigenous Peoples, which "claim the authority to make
law that does not depend on the state's authority."38 The fiduciary theory,
however, does not presuppose the legitimacy of existing state configurations, nor does it assume that states are the only legitimate form of political association. Although Fiduciaries of Humanity offers an interpretive
theory of the contemporary law of state recognition, we accept that nonstate institutions may exercise forms of authority under international
law. We also appreciate Davis's insight that current compliance with the
fiduciary criterion, while a necessary condition for legitimate state authority, may not be sufficient to establish legitimacy when a state has acquired that authority through military aggression or colonial annexation
in violation of the prohibition on unilateralism.
Davis also contends that Fiduciaries of Humanity "overstates the
power of the fiduciary conception as such to resolve ...
problems" and "pre-

36

37

See Jens David Ohlin, "In Praise of Jus Cogens' Conceptual Incoherence" (2018) 63:3&4
McGill LJ 701.
One of us has since argued that the fiduciary criterion can play this kind of role in an
anti-positivist jurisprudence that takes seriously the role-based norms of representation. See Evan Fox-Decent, "Jurisprudential Reflections on Cosmopolitan Law" in Jacco
Bomhoff, David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole, eds, The Double-Facing Constitution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) [forthcoming in 2020].
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scribe particular doctrines in international law."39 He seems to believe
that our theory cannot succeed unless private law concepts and doctrines
offer clear, unequivocal, and uncontroversial guidance for debates in international law.40 This criticism misses the mark because it mischaracterizes the shape of our argument. Nowhere in Fiduciariesof Humanity do
we argue that the bare legal concept of a fiduciary relationship as such
dictates the resolution of particular problems in public international law.
Rather, we articulate a normatively rich interpretive theory of the fiduciary relationship based on principles of non-domination and noninstrumentalization as well as the fiduciary criterion, and we argue that
this conception best captures core features of international law.41
We do not deny, of course, that other scholars have offered alternative
interpretive theories of fiduciary obligations. We also recognize that national courts and legislatures have adopted varying formulations of private fiduciary law rules, and some of these formulations are in tension
with our conception of the fiduciary relationship. But focusing on these
doctrinal divisions, interesting as they may be, misses the point of our
analysis.
Our argument in Fiduciariesof Humanity does not depend on the international community reaching a consensus about the normative basis
for fiduciary obligations in private law. For our interpretive theory to succeed, we need only show that the normative concerns that underpin our
theory of fiduciary duties in private law are shared by international law,
and that these normative concerns offer intelligible criteria for explaining,
clarifying, and critiquing positive international law. Fiduciaries of Humanity meets this burden by explaining how two guiding normative principle s-non-domination and non-instrumentalization-underwrite the
rules of state recognition, human rights, and peremptory norms in international law. These normative principles enable the fiduciary theory to
address a variety of challenging questions, such as the difference between
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; whether the prohi-

39
40
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Ibid at 743.
See ibid at 750.

At several points in his essay, Davis does acknowledge these contributions when he observes that our "core argument is as much a claim about the nature of fiduciary duties
as it is a claim about the fiduciary nature of a state's duties." Ibid at 733; see also ibid
at 751 (asserting that Fiduciariesof Humanity "rethinks problems of private fiduciary
law together with problems arising in public law"). This is exactly right. Elsewhere, one
of us has argued that the principles of non-domination and non-instrumentalization also best capture the central features of private fiduciary law. See Evan J Criddle, "Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law" (2017) 95:5 Texas L Rev 993.
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bition against state corruption is a jus cogens norm; and whether states
have positive legal duties to guarantee access to secondary education.
Davis is right to associate our fiduciary theory of international law
with "a lawyer's mindset about politics."42 At the very core of a lawyer's
mindset is a commitment to the rule of law, and the fiduciary theory is a
theory about how the rule of law operates in international affairs. It is
with this commitment to the rule of law firmly in view that we characterize the fiduciary criterion as part of the "constitution of international law,"
while emphasizing that international law's constitutionalization is, to
quote Martti Koskenniemi, less "an architectural project" than an emancipatory "programme of moral and political regeneration." 4 3
Like Fuller's account of the rule of law, the fiduciary theory's "primary
appeal" is to international lawyers' "sense of trusteeship" and "the pride of
the craftsman." 44 Lawyers, by virtue of their professional training and
role, are uniquely positioned to cultivate and safeguard the rule of law.
Thus, if the rule of law is to thrive in international affairs, it will depend
on international lawyers recognizing that they are not only advocates and
advisors for their clients, but also guardians of the rule of law and fiduci45
aries of humanity.
We share Davis's conviction that subjecting power to "the rule of lawand the rule of lawyers-is not the only way to transform" international
society for the better.46 To make real progress, the international community must also nurture a political culture and institutions that will complement the law in establishing a global society where all people enjoy secure and equal freedom. When all is said and done, international lawyers'
efforts to promote an international culture of legality might be less critical

to the cause of global justice than the work that diplomats, civil servants,
activists, and humanitarians perform in cultivating a cosmopolitan politi42

Davis, supra note 38, at 756. We therefore embrace Davis's effort to connect our work
with Martti Koskenniemi's vision of an international "culture of formalism." Ibid at 756.
Indeed, in Fiduciariesof Humanity we claim common cause with Koskenniemi in viewing global constitutionalism as a "mindset" or "practice of professional judgment." See
Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity, supra note 1 at 38 (quoting Martti

Koskenniemi, "Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflection on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization" (2007) 8:1 Theoretical Inquiries in L 9 at 18).
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For discussion of the relationship between lawyers' first-order fiduciary duties to their
clients and their second-order fiduciary duties to legal systems, see Evan J Criddle &
Evan Fox-Decent, "Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual Commissions of Public Fiduciaries" in Evan J Criddle et al, eds, FiduciaryGovernment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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cal and ethical culture, designing institutions, and introducing economic
reforms that reflect compassion, inclusion, and generosity for the desti47
tute and disenfranchised at home and abroad.
Nonetheless, we think it would be a grave mistake to infer from this
that international law cannot play an essential part in the establishment
of a just global order. As Fuller recognized, law is the social mechanism by
which political communities affirm that every person is entitled to respect
as an autonomous, self-determining agent. Law accomplishes this, in part,
through the formal features of legal norms that Fuller identifies. Yet,
Fuller's eight desiderata do not exhaust the demands of legality. As we
have shown in Fiduciariesof Humanity, the internal morality of international law also requires that public authorities respect people as rational,
autonomous agents by observing the prohibition on unilateralism and the
fiduciary criterion. These features of international law's internal morality
find expression throughout positive international law. They provide the
normative and conceptual structure through which peoples and individuals can progress toward a more just international order on terms of equal
freedom.
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